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Objective: We extend the theory of conceptual cat-
egories to flight safety events, to understand variations in 
pilot event knowledge.
Background: Experienced, highly trained pilots 
sometimes fail to recognize events, resulting in proce-
dures not being followed, damaging safety. Recognition is 
supported by typical, representative members of a con-
cept. Variations in typicality (“gradients”) could explain 
variations in pilot knowledge, and hence recognition. The 
role of simulations and everyday flight operations in the 
acquisition of useful, flexible concepts is poorly under-
stood. We illustrate uses of the theory in understanding 
the industry- wide problem of nontypical events.
Method: One hundred and eighteen airline pilots 
responded to scenario descriptions, rating them for typi-
cality and indicating the source of their knowledge about 
each scenario.
Results: Significant variations in typicality in flight 
safety event concepts were found, along with key gradi-
ents that may influence pilot behavior. Some concepts 
were linked to knowledge gained in simulator encounters, 
while others were linked to real flight experience.
Conclusion: Explicit training of safety event concepts 
may be an important adjunct to what pilots may variably 
glean from simulator or operational flying experiences, 
and may result in more flexible recognition and improved 
response.
Application: Regulators, manufacturers, and training 
providers can apply these principles to develop new ap-
proaches to pilot training that better prepare pilots for 
event diversity.
Keywords: concepts, typicality, familiarity, training, 
knowledge, aviation safety
INTRODUCTION
In July 2013, a Boeing 777–200ER, operated 
by Asiana Airlines, struck the sea wall in front of 
the threshold of runway 28 Left at San Francisco 
International Airport, USA. The aircraft was 
destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire, and 
three passengers were fatally injured (National 
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2014b). 
The crew were carrying out a visual approach, in 
good weather, but did not recognize unsafe aircraft 
energy and flight path conditions. For a sustained 
period, the aircraft was higher and faster than a 
typical approach, with a low thrust setting. At 
the final approach fix, just over five miles from 
touchdown, the aircraft was 450 feet too high, and 
shortly afterwards an incorrect autopilot mode was 
briefly selected, resulting in a pitch up command. 
The crew disconnected the autopilot, manually 
pitched down toward the runway, and selected idle 
thrust, but by 1000 feet, the approach path indi-
cations, visible from the cockpit, still indicated 
the aircraft was significantly above the desirable 
descent profile. As the aircraft passed through 400 
feet, it briefly crossed the correct flightpath, but 
with idle thrust and a high descent rate the aircraft 
rapidly sank and the energy decayed below critical 
levels. Then, 2.5 s before ground impact, the pilot 
monitoring called “go- around,” to abandon the 
landing, but it was too late, and the aircraft hit the 
sea wall and the tail section broke off. The aircraft 
never achieved the required stabilized approach 
criteria, exceeding flight path, thrust, speed, and 
vertical speed parameters.
There were over 26,000 flying hours in the 
cockpit, yet the crew were unable to recognize 
that the aircraft breached the approach safety 
criteria and therefore did not action the appro-
priate response protocol. This failure to recog-
nize and respond to an unstabilized flight path 
on final approach is an enduring safety problem 
Month XXXX - Human Factors2
(e.g., Air Accidents Investigation Branch [AAIB], 
2014; Dutch Safety Board [DSB], 2010; NTSB, 
2014a), but recognition failures have also featured 
in instrument data malfunctions (e.g., unreliable 
airspeed and stall; Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Anal-
yses [BEA], 2012) and flight control events (e.g., 
erroneous angle of attack data leading to activation 
of flight control augmentation system; Aircraft 
Accident Investigation Bureau of Ethiopia [AIB], 
2019; Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi 
[KNKT], 2019). How can experienced pilots, with 
many hours of simulator training, fail to recognize 
these events? Events that should be so familiar 
to knowledgeable flight crew. It is the aim of this 
study to answer that question.
In this study, we explore an overlooked aspect 
of human cognition: the theory of conceptual cate-
gories. This suggests humans reduce sensory expe-
riences into groups that share features (Harnad, 
2005; Pothos & Wills, 2011). Members of concep-
tual groups are not equal, and some prove more 
useful than others. For example, typical category 
members provide humans with a cognitive advan-
tage, being easier to verify and learn (Rosch et al., 
1976; Sandberg et al., 2012). This is the “typical-
ity effect” (Rosch et al., 1976) and it is possible 
that exposure to typical event structures, in both 
simulated encounters and everyday work, may 
leave pilots with inadequate event knowledge, 
and poorly positioned to recognize and respond 
to some events (Clewley & Nixon, 2019). In this 
article, we review a literature that offers to explain 
how pilots might end up with significant variations 
in event knowledge, perhaps far from the robust, 
comprehensive knowledge we imagine. We find 
out where pilot knowledge is built and incubated, 
and examine the effect this may have on recog-
nition. We develop two research hypotheses to 
locate systematic variations in pilot knowledge. 
We go on to discuss how this approach can help 
address weaknesses in pilot training and stimulate 
debate about how pilots acquire the sophisticated 
concepts required to manage some events.
THE THEORY OF CONCEPTUAL 
CATEGORIES
Conceptual categories are groups of objects 
and events that are treated equivalently by the 
cognitive system (Harnad, 2005). This means 
we can behave differently, to different things; 
a domestic cat and a tiger share many features, 
but our ability to recognize and discriminate is 
central to our cognitive and behavioral flexibil-
ity. There is renewed interest in conceptual cat-
egories (Hackett, 2017) and laboratory- based 
research has revealed a range of important 
knowledge effects that have not been exploited. 
There have been calls for its application to be 
widened to more real- world settings (Burnett 
et al., 2005; Goldstone et al., 2018). We 
respond to this and organize our research into 
two themes derived from literature on concepts: 
typicality and exemplar exposure.
Typicality
Typicality is the degree to which an instance 
serves as a good, central member of a con-
cept (Rosch, 1975). Everyday concepts, such 
as “bird,” exhibit variations in typicality—the 
robin is reliably judged more typical than the 
penguin (Nosofsky, 1988). Variations in typical-
ity are described as typicality gradients. Rated 
typicality provides strong empirical evidence 
that concepts exhibit gradients (Dry & Storms, 
2010). Typicality gradients have been observed 
in a variety of contexts, including animals 
and social situations (Dry & Storms, 2010). 
Typicality is cognitively advantageous. One 
such advantage, the typicality effect, suggests 
that typical instances are more readily learned 
and more easily recognized—they are stronger 
concepts and describe where our knowledge 
is concentrated (Rosch et al., 1976; Sandberg 
et al., 2012; Storms et al., 2000). The robin is 
more efficiently categorized as a bird than the 
penguin. It is a more representative and useful 
instance (Murphy & Ross, 2005).
The clearest and best cases of concept mem-
bership are known as prototypes (Rosch, 1975) 
and these act as cognitive reference points from 
which objects are judged more, or less, typical 
(Lakoff, 1987). Prototypical situations are more 
accessible, easier to describe, and richer in con-
tent, and allow actors to plan and order behavior 
(Cantor et al., 1982; Markman & Ross, 2003); 
this is a theoretical explanation of subopti-
mal behavior in nontypical events. Behavioral 
evidence of the typicality effect is supported 
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by electrophysiological data, which indicate 
typical items receive preferential processing, 
detectable in event- related potentials (Lei et al., 
2010; Wang et al., 2016).
If typicality provides a cognitive advan-
tage, then nontypical concepts may create 
cognitive disadvantage. This could cause 
delayed or inappropriate human response, 
which could represent risk to flight safety. 
This is a potential explanation for the diffi-
culty in so- called reframing, when confronted 
with a surprising stimulus (Landman et al., 
2017, 2018). The notion of typicality is com-
patible with sensemaking, and Weick (1995, 
p. 111) specifically notes that without “proto-
typical past moments” searching for context 
and meaning can be prolonged. Prototypical 
events are also found in the influential 
recognition- primed decision model, fostering 
more efficient strategies in decision- making 
environments like firefighting (Klein, 1998; 
Klein et al., 1986). Typical concepts feed 
into frames, and if knowledge is concentrated 
around a typical case, this will reduce cogni-
tive flexibility when exotic events arise.
Typicality also accommodates the observa-
tion that some cases exhibit conceptual ambi-
guity. There are borderline, boundary cases 
that are not central or readily recognized 
because of conflicting or incomplete infor-
mation (Genero & Cantor, 1987; Hampton, 
1998). The aggregation of available cues and 
markers is insufficient for precise or adequate 
recognition (Clewley & Nixon, 2019). This 
feature is prominent in medical (mis)diag-
nosis and natural categories such as “birds” 
(e.g., featherless and flightless violating typ-
ical markers) reflecting diversity and vari-
ability within concepts. This principle has 
been linked to aircraft accidents (Clewley & 
Nixon, 2019). In 2009, the pilots of an Air 
France Airbus A330, operating flight AF447, 
were unable to recognize a loss of reliable 
airspeed data and an aerodynamic stall (BEA, 
2012). Event ambiguity is reported as a sig-
nificant factor in the history of AF447- type 
events. Thirteen other flight crews, from five 
different airlines, had experienced similar air-
speed data malfunctions in flight, and at least 
nine of those crews had either not diagnosed 
or misdiagnosed the malfunction. None of the 
crews appeared to use the correct response 
protocol (BEA, 2012). Several crews misdi-
agnosed it as something similar, yet different, 
to the actual malfunction (BEA, 2012). This 
suggests these events were borderline, not 
immediately intelligible as a loss of air speed 
data, and not sufficiently clear to promote 
the use of an unusual memory checklist. This 
could suggest a systematic weakness in rec-
ognition capability, not errors specific to the 
crew of AF447. Typicality may be an import-
ant component of overall concept strength 
and unfavorable typicality gradients may be 
expressed through delayed or inappropriate 
pilot behavior.
We propose that typicality gradients drive 
pilot behavior. Knowledge is contoured and 
varied. The question of typicality is essen-
tially how central a case is to a concept. This 
is the basis of any typicality hypothesis—a 
robin is more central to the concept “bird” 
than a penguin; a great white shark is more 
central to the concept “shark” than a hooded 
carpet shark; a chimpanzee is more central 
to the concept “primate” than a mongoose 
lemur. For this research, we have selected 
two event concepts from current trends in air-
craft accidents after reviewing manufactur-
ers’ surveys and reports from three national 
accident investigation bodies. Using these 
event concepts, we address the first research 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The candidate flight safety 
events will vary in how central they are to 
an event concept.
The events’ “unstabilized approach to land” 
and “fuel system” were selected to test 
Hypothesis 1. Both event concepts feature in 
the Evidence- Based Recurrent Training Matrix 
for large public transport aircraft types 
(International Air Transport Association, 2013). 
Unstabilized approach to land events are flight 
path management competency based, and fuel 
system events are technical system manage-
ment based. For each of these event concepts, 
three event types will be examined. The 
Month XXXX - Human Factors4
development of the experimental stimuli is 
reported fully in the “Method” section.
Training With Exemplars: Where Aare 
Concepts Incubated?
Allied to typicality, familiarity is the sub-
jective estimate of how often something has 
been experienced (Nosofsky, 1988). Familiarity 
covaries with repetition, so familiarity is an 
important driver of recognition, retrieval, and 
learning (Barsalou, 1985; Nosofsky, 1988; 
Rosch, 1978). Familiarity is associated with the 
exemplar theory of concepts, which proposes 
concept judgments are based on particular 
instances that have already been encountered 
(Smith & Medin, 1981), rather than prototypi-
cal reference points.
For pilots, familiarity can be built in either 
real- world encounters, or synthetic encoun-
ters, in a simulator. Understanding how famil-
iarity relates to these contexts can indicate 
pilot exposure to event content. It is a proxy not 
only for experience, but also for the type and 
emphasis of experience. These experiences 
are likely to be the only direct opportunities 
for pilots to acquire crucial event knowledge 
that will inform recognition. The characteris-
tics of each context, such as the diversity of 
exemplar and opportunity to acquire cues and 
markers, could explain why pilot knowledge 
later proves inadequate to recognize a real- 
world encounter.
We know of no data that specify patterns 
of pilot knowledge acquisition, yet these pat-
terns could be important. Some event famil-
iarity may primarily be built and incubated 
in simulated encounters that are predictable, 
brief, crude, or combined with other com-
plex scenarios (Clewley & Nixon, 2019). 
The structure of airline pilot training means 
that abnormal events in the simulator are 
often expected. Training encounters may 
be predictable to the extent of negating any 
recognition benefits—pilots are so familiar 
with often- repeated events that they are not 
required to recognize them, but training may 
give the illusion of recognition (Casner et al., 
2013). Pilot performance can drop below 
minimum acceptable standards even when 
well- understood events are presented in dif-
ferent contexts (Casner et al., 2013). Startle 
and surprise can be generated by including 
unexpected elements into simulator training, 
to boost pilot skills (Landman et al., 2018). 
Even so, current pilot training could pose a 
poorly understood, yet significant, burden on 
pilots to acquire event content amid cognitive 
constraints. A contrived, simple exemplar of a 
malfunction, perhaps involving highly sophis-
ticated technology, may not provide adequate 
pilot knowledge. This is an “exemplar effect” 
(Clewley & Nixon, 2019), which may have 
influenced pilot behavior in the AF447- type 
events (BEA, 2012).
Conversely, everyday work in flight oper-
ations can be susceptible to repetition, and 
hence typicality effects. This could foster 
narrow concepts, like prototypes, especially 
if everyday work exhibits limited variety and 
diversity. This has the potential to reduce cog-
nitive flexibility. When nontypical situations 
arise, such as unusual combinations of factors, 
pilots may be poorly positioned to recognize 
high- risk event markers. This is a candidate 
theoretical explanation for flight crew not rec-
ognizing unstabilized approach events. These 
events can carry risk of runway excursions 
and fatalities (e.g., NTSB, 2014a, 2014b), 
yet pilots sometimes continue approaches 
even with gross exceedances of parameters. If 
pilots rely on knowledge built in real- world 
flight operations, this could explain why they 
do not have the useful concepts needed to rec-
ognize unusual events.
We propose to examine these patterns of 
concept familiarity. Where is pilot knowl-
edge built and incubated? Simulator experi-
ences will provide exemplars of events, while 
flight operations will be subject to typicality 
effects that limit knowledge, revealing paucity 
or absence of training. An improved under-
standing of concept familiarity may explain 
some recognition failures and provide train-
ing insights. This leads to our second research 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Pilot reliance on simulator 
or flight operations for event familiarity 
will vary for the candidate events.
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METHOD
Design
We used a repeated- measures experimental 
design to test the hypotheses. Participants were 
required to respond to flight safety events built 
into scenario descriptions, similar in nature 
to clinical vignettes used in nursing research 
(e.g., Hughes & Huby, 2002). Scenarios were 
constructed with “slots” that accommodate the 
independent variable. The scenario descriptions 
are shown in the appendix.
Scenario Development
Event features were taken from accident 
reports in the public domain or extracted from 
Flight Crew Operating Manuals. A subject- 
matter expert in the host airline checked the 
scenarios for accuracy. Materials were piloted 
and minor adjustments were made so that the 
scenarios were representative of the aircraft 
type and flight operation at the host airline. 
Scenarios were developed around the following 
two themes.
Unstabilized approach to land events. This 
refers to a class of event where the aircraft fails 
to meet certain safety criteria when approaching 
to land (Clewley & Stupple, 2015). The toler-
ances are based on flight path (e.g., descend-
ing too quickly) or aircraft configuration (e.g., 
wheels not down). We used three types of spe-
cific event relating to the flight path parameters. 
This decision was based on the host airline’s 
experience of these types of safety event. We 
represented all three flight path parameter event 
types at the host airline.
A “high speed” event refers to a speed tol-
erance being exceeded. A “high vertical speed” 
event refers to rate of descent exceedance. A 
“thrust idle” event refers to low engine thrust 
setting. In the scenario descriptions, one param-
eter exceeded tolerances and the other two 
parameters were normal. These events can lead 
to aircraft failing to meet landing performance 
criteria and runway excursions (e.g., AAIB, 
2014).
Fuel system events. The fuel system refers 
to the storage and delivery of fuel from the tanks 
to the engines. We used three types of specific 
event. This was based on the host airline’s fuel 
quantity status procedures from the Operations 
Manual.
A “minor fuel imbalance” refers to a condi-
tion where the fuel quantity in tanks no longer 
match. An “arrival fuel downward trend” refers 
to a condition where in- flight calculations show 
the predicted landing fuel to be diminishing, 
indicating the aircraft is using fuel at a higher 
rate than planned. A “fuel leak” refers to fuel 
that is escaping from the tank to engine closed 
system. These events can cause reduction in 
aircraft range and in- flight fires (e.g., AAIB, 
2015).
Dependent Variables
We used a scale of 1–9 to measure typical-
ity, using the anchors not at all (1) and very (9). 
These have been established and validated in 
previous research on concepts (e.g., Barsalou, 
1987; Rothbart et al., 1996). A subject- matter 
expert at the host airline was consulted to pro-
vide options for source of concept familiarity. 
Four possibilities were identified: flight simu-
lator devices, everyday flight operations, tech-
nical/operational manuals and checklists, and 
classroom study. Flight simulator devices and 
everyday flight operations provide direct event 
experience. Participants were asked to indicate 
the primary source of event knowledge.
Participants and Procedures
The research procedure and protocol were 
approved by the University Ethics Committee. 
Pilots were recruited at the host airline through 
workplace notices. After expressing interest, 
each respondent was sent a link to the Qualtrics 
survey platform (Qualtrics, Provo, Utah, USA) 
and completed the survey online.
In total, 118 pilots took part in the study. 
Two pools of pilots were used from two differ-
ent bases. They all worked at the same European 
short- haul airline. Pool one: N = 70, 26 Captains, 
44 First Officers, mean age 33.7 years (SD = 
8.5), median flying experience 2800 hr, range = 
13,900 hr, minimum 100 hr. Pool two: N = 48, 21 
Captains, 27 First Officers, mean age 32.7 years, 
(SD = 7.5), median flying experience 2650 hr, 
range 10,820 hr, minimum 180 hr. All pilots were 
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current in European short- haul flying operations 
on the same aircraft type.
Participants gave informed consent and com-
pleted the tasks online using the supplied link. 
The questions and response choices were pre-
sented in random order.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was carried out in IBM SPSS 
(version 25). We examined quartile- quartile 
plots for our typicality data, observing they 
approximated to normal distribution. We exam-
ined other literature on typicality ratings and 
found they exclusively use parametric statis-
tical tests (e.g., Rosch et al., 1976; Rossiter & 
Best, 2013; Rothbart et al., 1996). We elected 
to use repeated- measure t- test and analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) to report the typicality gra-
dients. There were no violations of sphericity. 
Pearson χ2 was used to report main effects and 
post hoc differences in primary source of con-
cept familiarity. Pairwise and post hoc compari-
sons were Bonferroni corrected. Effect size was 
reported as r, partial eta squared, or Cramer’s 
V. The conventional α of <.05 was considered 
significant.
RESULTS
Typicality Ratings
To provide a baseline and replicate a clas-
sic typicality gradient, participants were asked 
to rate the everyday concept “bird.” Figure 1 
shows “robin” was rated as significantly more 
typical than “penguin,” t (47) = 12.65, p < .001, 
r = .84.
Unstable approach to land events. Figure 2 
shows mean rated typicality for the three 
approach types. There was a significant main 
effect for approach type, F(1, 69) = 6.08, 
p < .005, partial η² = .081. The high speed 
condition (M = 5.76, SD = 2.01, CI 95% 
[5.28–6.24]), was judged significantly more 
typical (p < .05) than the high vertical speed 
condition (M = 4.91, SD = 2.26, CI 95% 
[4.38–5.46]) and significantly more typical 
(p < .01) than the thrust idle condition (M = 4.74, 
SD = 2.00, CI 95% [4.26–5.22]). There was no 
significant difference of rated typicality between 
high vertical speed and thrust idle. Overall, the 
high- speed condition was rated significantly 
more typical than the high vertical speed and 
thrust idle conditions.
Figure 1. Mean rated typicality (with 95% confidence interval) for an everyday concept. 
This replicates a classic typicality gradient from concept research, indicating concentrations 
of knowledge and concept strength.
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Fuel system events. Figure 3 describes a typ-
icality gradient across three fuel- related events.
There was a significant main effect for 
event type, F(1, 47) = 66.94, p < .001, partial 
η² = .588. The fuel imbalance (M = 6.47, 
SD = 2.23, CI 95% [5.82–7.13]) was judged sig-
nificantly more typical (p < .001) than the arrival 
fuel downward trend (M = 4.52, SD = 1.99, CI 
95% [3.95–5.10]) and the fuel leak (M = 1.85, 
SD = 1.44, CI 95% [1.44–2.74]). Pairwise 
comparison, with Bonferroni correction, indi-
cates arrival fuel downward trend was judged 
Figure 2. Mean rated typicality (with 95% confidence interval) for three types of unstable 
approach.
Figure 3. Mean rated typicality (with 95% confidence interval) for three fuel- related 
events.
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significantly more typical than fuel leak (p < 
.001).
Source of Concept Familiarity
There was a significant main effect for pri-
mary source of concept familiarity (χ²(3) = 64.38, 
p < .001, Cramer’s V .567, N = 70). For fuel 
events, 46% of pilots reported the simulator as 
primary, 6% flight operations, 23% manuals, and 
25% classroom. For unstable approach events, 
18% reported the simulator as primary, 59% 
flight operations, 10% manuals, and 13% class-
room. The post hoc comparison using adjusted 
residuals (Figure 4), with Bonferroni correction, 
indicates the flight simulator is more influen-
tial as a primary source of knowledge for fuel 
events, compared with unstable approach events 
(χ²(1) = 18.01, p < .001, N = 70). Flight opera-
tions are more influential as a primary source of 
knowledge for unstable approach events, com-
pared with fuel events (χ²(1) = 64.02, p < .001, 
N = 70).
Overall, fuel events rely more heavily on 
simulated encounters when compared with 
unstable approach events. Unstable approach 
events exhibit a reversal of emphasis, placing 
more reliance on everyday flight operations.
DISCUSSION
We extended the theory of conceptual cat-
egories to flight safety events, translating two 
key elements, typicality and exemplar expo-
sure, to a new domain. This approach provides 
new insights into the neglected topic of pilot 
knowledge and offers opportunities to address 
weaknesses in pilot training.
We presented evidence captured from air-
line pilots of significant typicality gradients 
and systematic variations in the source of event 
familiarity. Typicality gradients can locate con-
centrations of knowledge and concept strength 
that predict pilot performance. We found key 
gradients that may influence pilot behavior. 
Pilot knowledge is built and incubated in differ-
ent psychological environments. These different 
environments may influence concept acquisition 
and the flexible deployment of knowledge in the 
real world. Some concepts may be over- reliant 
on simulated encounters, while others are linked 
to real flight experience, indicating paucity of 
training.
These findings provide empirical support to the 
lexicon and theoretical framework provided by 
Clewley and Nixon (2019), and stimulate debate 
about the industry- wide problem of nontypical 
flight safety events. Specifically, we developed 
Figure 4. Comparing differences in reported primary source of event familiarity for 
simulator and flight operations.
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and addressed two research hypotheses that we 
discuss next.
H1: The Candidate Flight Safety Events 
Will Vary in How Central They Are to an 
Event Concept
We replicated a classic typicality gradient 
from literature and demonstrated that flight 
safety events exhibit the same gradients as 
everyday objects. We also demonstrated a 
significant typicality gradient for unstable 
approach to land events. The high- speed condi-
tion is rated as more typical than the high ver-
tical speed and the thrust idle conditions. It is 
possible that such significant typicality advan-
tages are important, but currently invisible, 
drivers of cognitive performance. Pilots may be 
more adept at recognizing and managing high- 
speed conditions because they are typical. For a 
given event, as pilots diverge from the typical 
case, cognitive performance declines (Rosch, 
1975). Thus, cases proximal to the typical may 
be safer. They represent where knowledge is 
concentrated, just as our knowledge of birds is 
concentrated around typical species. This prin-
ciple can now be applied to flight safety events 
to detect event types that warrant more specific, 
targeted training. Less typical forms of unsta-
ble approach, such as “thrust idle” conditions, 
are more likely to pose problems for pilot cog-
nition, and several recent incidents show this 
is often not detected—a corollary of how the 
pilot monitoring task may also favor typicality 
(see DSB, 2010; NTSB, 2014b for examples of 
prolonged thrust idle conditions not detected). 
Typicality gradients locate candidate events 
subject to typicality effects.
The fuel events that we examined show a sig-
nificant typicality gradient. This demonstrates 
a clear application of concept theory in iden-
tifying fragile concepts. Fuel leaks achieved 
the lowest mean typicality rating. This mea-
surement is a proxy for concept strength. Our 
method could be applied to rapidly detect areas 
of weakness in concept knowledge to inform 
training and education. The fuel leak case may 
suffer poor recognition and response character-
istics as pilots are likely to have limited knowl-
edge of cues and response protocols, as well 
as limited direct experience (see later in the 
“Discussion” section for concepts built in sim-
ulated encounters). Locating weak domains of 
events could also lead manufacturers to provid-
ing flight crew with better in- flight documenta-
tion and improved guidance in checklists. This 
could deliver, and maintain, better connections 
between nontypical event concepts and the 
response protocol, as suggested by Clewley and 
Nixon (2019). This could also mitigate startle 
and surprise effects by providing better refram-
ing knowledge for nontypical events (Landman 
et al., 2017).
H2: Pilot Reliance on Simulator or Flight 
Operations for Event Familiarity Will Vary 
for the Candidate Events
We found significant differences in the source 
of conceptual knowledge for our candidate events. 
This finding may be an important component 
in recognition failures by pilots. Two patterns 
emerged. The first pattern indicates pilot concepts 
for fuel system events are predominantly incubated 
in the simulator. The second pattern shows pilots 
rely on everyday flight operations to incubate and 
build conceptual knowledge of unstable approach 
events. This might indicate a lack of training for 
these event types and that the knowledge is simply 
built “on the job.”
For fuel system events, concepts are likely 
to be incubated during simulated encounters. 
Encounters in everyday flight operations appear 
to have limited influence, perhaps because of sys-
tem reliability. This places considerable burden on 
pilots during the simulated exemplars. Drawing 
on Casner et al. (2013), pilots must process event 
markers during simulator tests. There is scope to 
analyze whether pilots prioritize recognition skills 
or whether they are prevented from doing this 
by other cognitive tasks related to the simulation 
and skills test. If high- demand, nontypical events 
tend to be simulated exemplars, pilots should have 
adequate opportunity to process event content. It 
is significant that several other flight crews were 
unable to successfully recognize and manage an 
AF447- type airspeed sensor event (BEA, 2012). 
These reports from other flight crews suggest 
pilots may have weaker conceptual knowledge 
of these events. This could be explained by poor 
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opportunities to acquire markers in exemplars or 
that the real- world encounter is dissimilar to the 
simulator exemplar. It is possible that exemplars 
presented in training or testing cannot provide the 
sophisticated conceptual understanding needed in 
real world encounters.
Unstable approach familiarity favors everyday 
flight operations. This may indicate a lack of train-
ing for these events. Concepts crucial to recogni-
tion may have to be acquired on an ad- hoc basis 
in everyday work. This could explain why pilots 
have recognition problems. If everyday work 
exhibits typical patterns or limited variety, there 
may be little or no exposure to demanding sets 
of cues and markers. Perhaps these events are not 
amenable to high- quality simulations, so receive 
little useful attention in airline training regimes? 
This is a possible explanation for flight crews not 
recognizing unstable approaches (e.g., NTSB, 
2014a, 2014b). The Asiana Airlines Boeing 777 
accident, described in the opening paragraph, 
featured a combination of nontypical elements. 
Normal levels of automation were not used and 
normal approach aids were not available, provid-
ing key differences with typical task execution. 
This finding suggests we may not be equipping 
pilots with the flexible, useful concepts needed 
to recognize some events, perhaps simply due to 
paucity or absence of training.
Recommendations to Improve Safety
Explicitly train event concepts. Pilot training 
should train event concepts, embracing typical 
and nontypical event structures, building broader 
knowledge around the current simulator exem-
plars and everyday event prototypes. Do not just 
master an exemplar in the simulator and expect it 
to be a flexible knowledge tool. Likewise, every-
day flight operations are not an ideal teacher of 
event concepts. Training the robin will not pre-
pare us for the penguin. One way to achieve this 
is to provide innovative ways of transferring event 
content to pilots, such as in- cockpit digital appli-
cations. This could improve pilot knowledge of 
events like unstable approaches and nontypical 
technical events. We offer a theory- driven method 
to do that.
Locate key typicality gradients. Our results 
suggest pilots experience typicality gradients in 
flight operations that may damage event recog-
nition. Our recommendation is to locate these 
gradients and understand the effect they have on 
pilot behavior and performance. For some event 
types and domains, the typicality gradients may 
be steep, giving pilots cognitive problems. Some 
aircraft technology can be poorly understood, 
even by training pilots (see NTSB, 2014b, for a 
discussion on pilot knowledge of the Boeing 777 
auto flight behavior) so we think it is important to 
locate areas of weaker knowledge. This may indi-
cate where to supplement pilot training and cockpit 
materials, for example, providing extra diagnostic 
guidance in checklists or adjusting memory- based 
protocols for nontypical events.
Strengths, Limitations, and Further 
Research
We have contributed a theory- driven anal-
ysis of pilot event knowledge adding typical-
ity gradients, typicality effects, and exemplar 
effects to the human factors literature. We 
have proposed practical ways of linking this 
approach to innovations in training and pilot 
response protocols. This builds empirical 
evidence to support the theoretical apparatus 
proposed by Clewley and Nixon (2019) and 
provides an incremental contribution to a 
neglected area: pilot knowledge.
Naturally, our research has limitations. We 
have used two event types, although there is 
now scope to expand this to other domains of 
pilot event knowledge. Our event choices are 
not necessarily generalizable to the many other 
flight safety events that may have their own 
typicality profile. Nevertheless, we have shown 
that flight safety events are vulnerable to a typ-
icality effect. Also, the type of flight operation 
may have influenced the results. Our sample 
were short- haul pilots. It is possible that long- 
haul pilots, spending more time in cruise phases 
and doing fewer landings, may have different 
experiences of events, such as fewer unstable 
approaches and greater reliance on simulated 
encounters. In our scenario descriptions, we 
were careful to use terminology derived from 
aircraft documentation, but participants were 
not immersed in a dynamic simulation or a real- 
world encounter. We suggest typicality gradients 
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are explored with dynamic cues to further vali-
date the approach. Real event encounters often 
evolve, so the availability of cues changes over 
time, and this may influence recognition. Future 
research should focus on measurement of cog-
nitive performance predicted by typicality gra-
dients to refine our understanding of the effects 
on recognition and response and elucidate the 
mechanisms involved—for example, clarifying 
the influence of typicality in extracting import-
ant perceptual event features and the comple-
mentary role of working memory.
There is reason to be optimistic that this the-
oretical approach could be aimed toward pub-
lic emergency response events. For instance, 
in the United Kingdom in June 2017, a tower 
block fire caused significant loss of life and 
presented public emergency responders with 
a variety of complex problems (see Grenfell 
Tower Inquiry, 2017). These sorts of events are 
unusual and present an array of nontypical and 
unfamiliar stimuli that are demanding, even for 
experienced professionals. Concept theory is 
well positioned to expand explanations of these 
important phenomena and inform evidence- 
based improvements. This overlooked attribute 
of human cognition may explain some recent 
aircraft accidents, and, if better understood can 
be used to improve safety.
APPENDIX
Screenshots of All Six Scenario 
Descriptions Used in the Typicality Rating 
Task
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KEY POINTS
 ● We demonstrate how concept theory can be 
applied to understand nontypical flight safety 
events.
 ● We provide empirical evidence of variations in 
typicality (“gradients”) and systematic variations 
in the source of event familiarity.
 ● We explain why typicality and exemplar effects 
may degrade recognition, response and safety.
 ● We propose evolving pilot training and response 
protocols to explicitly train broader, more useful 
event concepts.
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